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VETTING BILLS IN THE SCOTTISH PARLIAMENT FOR LEGISLATIVE COMPETENCE 
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A. Introduction 
 
Unlike Acts of the United Kingdom Parliament, primary legislation made by the Scottish Parliament is 
not immune from judicial review.1 The devolved legislature is a parliament of limited competence, 
the boundaries of which are found in both statute and the common law. Accordingly, an Act of the 
Scottish ParliĂŵĞŶƚ ?^W ? “ŝƐŶŽƚůĂǁ ?ŝŶƐŽĨĂƌĂƐ ?inter alia ?ŝƚ  “ƌĞůĂƚĞƐƚŽ ?ĂƌĞƐĞƌǀĞĚŵĂƚƚĞƌ ?ŽƌŝƐ
incompatible with a Convention right or with EU law,2 and, in extreme circumstances, it is also 
invalid to the extent that it violates the fundamental principle(s) of the rule of law.3 Where the 
Parliament does legislate beyond those limits, courts have the power to set aside the offending Act. 
For those engaged in the law-making process  W from civil servants, to legislators, to courts, 
to those public bodies and private actors who rely on the rights and duties conferred by legislation  W 
ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞƐ ŽĨ ůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝŶŐ ďĞǇŽŶĚ ƚŚĞ WĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ĐŽŵƉĞƚĞŶĐĞ ĂƌĞ ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ƐĞǀĞƌĞ ? ĨŽƌ Ă
number of reasons. First, there is a clear risk of reputational damage both to the Scottish 
Government and to the Scottish Parliament where legislation is found to be defective. Second, 
because an Act might have been in force for some time, or have been widely and deeply relied upon, 
there may be uncertainty in the obligations arising from devolved legislation at least until such time 
as the matter has been settled by a court. Third, there are serious concerns for the Scottish 
Government if elements of its legislative agenda face delay and defeat. These concerns are not 
restricted to the inability to pursue and implement key policies but can have broader political and 
electoral effects for a government that is perceived to be failing to deliver its promises. Fourth, there 
is an associated remedial cost both in terms of the parliamentary time required to cure defective 
legislation and in terms of damages or other remedies that might arise as a result of an adverse 
judicial ruling. Finally, there is a possibility that courts themselves might suffer reputational damage 
where they are perceived to have overstepped the mark in striking down primary legislation passed 
by a democratically elected legislature.4 
                                                          
1 KŶƚŚĞƐƚĂƚƵƐŽĨĐƚƐŽĨƚŚĞ^ĐŽƚƚŝƐŚWĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚƐĞĞDĐ,ĂƌŐ ? “tŚĂƚŝƐĚĞůĞŐĂƚĞĚůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?PL 
539.  
2 Scotland Act 1998 s 29. 
3 AXA General Insurance v Lord Advocate [2011] UKSC 46, 2012 SC (UKSC) 122 at paras 42-52 per Lord Hope, 
and paras 136-154 per Lord Reed. Suggested examples of sufficiently extreme legislation includes: legislation 
which aims to abolish judicial review or to diminish the role of the courts in protecting individual rights (Lord 
Hope at para 51) or which seeks to curtail the franchise in order to entrench the power of a parliamentary 
majority (Moohan v Lord Advocate [2014] UKSC 67, 2015 SC (UKSC) 1 at para 35 per Lord Hodge).    
4 Whilst the political reaction to adverse rulings about legislative competence has so far been measured, the 
ŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚǇĨŽƌĨƌŝĐƚŝŽŶǁĂƐŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵƐŵĂĚĞŽĨƚŚĞ^ƵƉƌĞŵĞŽƵƌƚ ?ƐŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞďǇƚŚĞƚŚĞŶ
First Minister, Alex Salmond, and Justice Secretary, Kenny MacAskill, following adverse rulings by the Supreme 
Court in relation to aspects of Scots criminal law. On the political reaction to Cadder sĞĞdƌĞŶĐŚ ? “dŚĞĂĚĚĞƌ 
ĐĂƐĞĂŶĚůĞŐĂůĂĚǀŝĐĞĨŽƌƐƵƐƉĞĐƚƐŝŶ^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ ? ? ? ?KĐƚŽďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ?Devolution Matters blog, available at: 
<https://devolutionmatters.wordpress.com/2010/10/28/the-cadder-case-and-legal-advice-for-suspects-in-
scotland/> as well as the relevant links therein. For a detailed treatment of the legal issues which arose in  W 
  
In order to protect legislation against this vulnerability the Scotland Act 1998 established a 
framework of pre-enactment checks and cross-checks which engage the Scottish Government5 with 
both the Scottish Parliament and the UK Government in the exercise of vetting Bills for legislative 
competence: 
(1) On or before the introduction of a Bill, the responsible Minister must report to Parliament 
that in his or her view the Bill is ǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞWĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚ ?ƐůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝǀĞĐŽŵƉĞƚĞŶĐĞ ?6 
(2) On or before the introduction of a Bill, the Presiding Officer must report to Parliament his or 
her view as to whether or not ƚŚĞŝůůŝƐǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞWĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚ ?ƐůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝǀĞcompetence;7 
(3) &ŽůůŽǁŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŵƉůĞƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŝůů ?Ɛ ƉĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚĂƌǇ ƐƚĂŐĞƐ ? ƚŚĞ WƌĞƐŝĚŝŶŐ KĨĨŝĐĞƌ ŵƵƐƚ
withhold submission of the Bill for Royal Assent for four weeks,8 during which period the 
Scottish and UK Law Officers  W the Lord Advocate on behalf of the Scottish Government, and 
the Advocate General for Scotland and the Attorney General on behalf of the UK 
Government  W may refer the question of legislative competence directly to the Supreme 
Court.9 
 
In this article we examine the ways in which these institutions have engaged internally and with one 
another in the process of vetting Bills for legislative competence during the first four parliamentary 
sessions (1999-2016). By shedding light on a process that generally is concealed behind private 
discussions ĂŶĚůĞŐĂůĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶƚŝĂůŝƚǇ ?ǁŚĂƚůĂŶdƌĞŶĐŚŚĂƐĐĂůůĞĚ “ĂĨŽƌŵŽĨƉƌŝǀĂƚĞƉƵďůŝĐůĂǁ ? ?10 we 
will see (1) why it is that  W contrary to early warnings that strong judicial review might make 
^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ ?Ɛ  “Ă ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ũƵĚŐĞƐ ?11  W (successful) legal challenges to the competence of 
legislation have proved to be the exception rather than the rule, and (2) why it is that, despite this 
network of checks, legislation might nevertheless remain at risk of judicial censure. 
To understand the complex processes which constitute this exercise we interviewed more 
than twenty officials, advisers and politicians currently or formerly in the Scottish Government, 
Scottish Parliament and UK Government.12 During the course of our interviews officials who have 
been involved at each of the distinct vetting points stressed to us their commitment (and the faith 
that they have in the commitment of counterparts across those institutions) to make devolution 
work. Moreover, officials stressed to us that serious disagreement about legislative competence is a 
relatively (though not an insignificantly) rare occurrence during the legislative process, perhaps 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
and which flowed from  W this landmark case see the special issue on Cadder in (2011) 15(2) Edinburgh Law 
Review.     
5 In fact, section 6 of the Scotland Act 2012 extended this obligation to any person in charge of a Bill (including, 
ŝŶƚĞƌĂůŝĂ ?D^WƐŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐŝŶŐDĞŵďĞƌƐ ?ŝůůƐŽƌĐŽŶǀĞŶŽƌƐŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐŝŶŐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞŝůůƐ ? ?dŚis study, however, is 
concerned with scrutiny of the executive and so our focus in this article is on Government Bills. 
6 SA 1998 s31(1). 
7 SA 1998 s31(2). 
8 ibid. 
9 SA 1998 s33. 
10 DĞŵŽƌĂŶĚƵŵƐƵďŵŝƚƚĞĚƚŽƚŚĞ,ŽƵƐĞŽĨŽŵŵŽŶƐ:ƵƐƚŝĐĞŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ ?ƐŝŶƋƵŝƌǇDevolution: A Decade On 
inquiry (April 2007), available at 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmjust/529/529we15.htm>. 
11 K ?EĞŝůů ? “WĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚĂƌǇ^ŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶƚǇĂŶĚƚŚĞ:ƵĚŝĐŝĂůZĞǀŝĞǁŽĨ>ĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?ŝŶDĐ,ĂƌŐĂŶĚdDƵůůĞŶ
(eds), Public Law in Scotland (2006) 197. 
12 These interviews were conducted on the basis of anonymity, and (mostly) took place during the month of 
September 2015.    
  
arising once or twice during an average year. However, and this commitment notwithstanding, these 
interviews revealed differences within and across those institutions both with regard to how 
competence assessments are made and with regard to the expectations and anxieties of each as 
they engage in the process.  
The first part of the article focuses on the conceptual argument that, despite the strong form 
of judicial review that applies to Acts of the Scottish Parliament, the decision to require legislative 
review of every Bill for its constitutional quality aligns the devolution scheme with those political 
systems which  W in different ways - combine Westminster-style parliamentary government with 
judicially enforceable constitutional boundaries. Whilst these have been developed in the specific 
context of rights review we shall see that the Scottish variant augments these models in two senses: 
first, by applying legislative review to a broader set of constitutional considerations (namely EU law 
and the boundary between reserved and devolved matters); second, by multiplying and varying the 
points at which Bills are subject to legislative review. The second part of the article supports this 
conceptual argument with an empirical examination of the ways in which assessments about 
legislative competence are made by and between the Scottish Government, the Scottish Parliament 
and the UK Government.  
B. Legislative review: a third way 
/ŶƌĞĐĞŶƚǇĞĂƌƐƉƵďůŝĐůĂǁƐĐŚŽůĂƌƐŚŝƉŚĂƐƐŽƵŐŚƚƚŽĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŽĚĞĨĞŶĚ ?ĂŶĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞŽƌ “ƚŚŝƌĚ
ǁĂǇ ?ŽĨĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵ ?dŚŝƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚďƵŝůĚƐƵƉŽŶ ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶďƌĞĂŬƐǁŝƚŚ ?ĂŶƚĞĐĞĚĞŶƚŵŽĚĞůƐ
of legislative or judicial supremacy, in which either parliament or the courts have the last word on 
the legality of legislation.13 Two fundamental characteristics distinguish this alternative approach. 
One is constrained judicial remedial powers. For Westminster-based parliamentary systems, the very 
idea of introducing a judicially-enforceable bill of rights represents a fundamental departure from 
previously held assumptions that such instruments clash with the core constitutional principle of 
parliamentary supremacy. However, by distinguishing between judicial review and judicial remedies, 
ŝƚŝƐƉŽƐƐŝďůĞƚŽƌĞƚĂŝŶƉĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚ ?ƐůĂƐƚǁŽƌĚŽŶƚŚĞǀĂůŝĚŝƚǇŽĨůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝŽŶ ?dŚĞƐĞĐŽŶĚĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂů
characteristic is that this approach envisages a far more important role for rights review at the 
legislative stage than is usually associated with a bill of rights. By placing a statutory obligation on 
the executive to report to parliament when a Bill is inconsistent with rights this particular legislative 
focus reflects the following three ideals:14 identifying whether and how proposed legislation 
implicates rights; encouraging more rights-compliant ways of achieving legislative objectives (and in 
the extreme discourage the pursuit of objectives that are fundamentally incompatible with rights); 
and facilitating parliamentary deliberation about whether legislation implicates rights, thereby 
                                                          
13 See for example, S Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism: Theory and Practice 
(2013); :'ŽůĚƐǁŽƌƚŚǇ ? ?,ŽŵŽŐĞŶŝǌŝŶŐĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?OJLS 482; M Tushnet, Weak Courts, Strong 
Rights. Judicial Review and Social Welfare Rights in Comparative Constitutional Law  ? ? ? ? ? ? ?'tŝůůŝĂŵƐ ? “dŚĞ
Victoria Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities PŽƌŝŐŝŶƐĂŶĚƐĐŽƉĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?MULR 880; F Klug, Values 
ĨŽƌĂ'ŽĚůĞƐƐŐĞ ?dŚĞ^ƚŽƌǇŽĨƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ<ŝŶŐĚŽŵ ?ƐEĞǁŝůůŽĨZŝŐŚƚƐ(2000). 
14 These reporting obligations vary. Some are made by the Attorney General (New Zealand, ACT) or Justice 
Minister (Canada), whereas others are made by the sponsoring minister (UK and Victoria); some include only 
government Bills (Canada, UK); and some require reports only for inconsistency (Canada, New Zealand) 
whereas others report both affirmative and negative reports of compatibility (UK, ACT and Victoria). 
  
ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐƉĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇƚŽƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƚŽũƵƐƚŝĨǇ ?ĂůƚĞƌŽƌĂďĂŶĚŽŶůĞŐŝƐlation that 
unduly infringes rights.15 
(1) Judicial supremacy revisited 
/Ŷ ƐŽŵĞ ƌĞƐƉĞĐƚƐ^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ ?ƐĚĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶƐĐŚĞŵĞ ŝƐĂŶĞĂƚĨŝƚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŵŽĚĞůŽĨ ũƵĚŝĐŝĂů ƐƵƉƌĞŵĂĐǇ ?
First, the Scottish Parliament is not a sovereign legislature but one for which constitutional limits 
have been enshrined in statute. This is so not only because it is a subordinate legislature, itself 
constituted and limited by an Act of Parliament,16 but also because it was an aspiration of its framers 
that the new Parliament should distinguish itself from Westminster on the question of sovereignty. 
As Bernard Crick and David Millar said: 
dŚĞ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ ŽĨ ƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶƚǇ ?ŝƐ Ă ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚ ŽĨ Ă ďǇ-gone age when 
unchallengeable central power seemed to many (as in 1707) the only 
answer to continual civil war. National identity does not depend upon a 
belief in sovereign power rather than in a more pluralistic, 
constitutionalised account of power, defined and limited by law. A Scottish 
WĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌĞůĞĐƚĞĚ ?ŶĞĞĚƐůŝŵŝƚŝŶŐĂƐ ?ŵƵĐŚĂƐŶǇŽƚŚĞƌ ?17  
As Lord Rodger would later recognise, with regard to the question of unlimited legislative supremacy 
tĞƐƚŵŝŶƐƚĞƌ ŝƐ ƚŚĞ ĞǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ƌĂƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĂŶ ƚŚĞ ƌƵůĞ ? dŚĞ ^ĐŽƚƚŝƐŚ WĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚ ? ŚĞ ƐĂŝĚ ?  “ŚĂƐ ƐŝŵƉůǇ
ũŽŝŶĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ǁŝĚĞƌ ĨĂŵŝůǇ ŽĨ ƉĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚƐ ?who  “ĞǀĞŶ ǁŚĞƌĞ  ?ƚŚĞǇ ? ŚĂǀĞ ďĞĞŶ ŵŽĚĞůůĞĚ ŝŶ ƐŽŵĞ
respects on Westminster [nevertheless] owe their existence and powers to statute and are in 
ǀĂƌŝŽƵƐǁĂǇƐƐƵďũĞĐƚƚŽůĂǁĂŶĚƚŚĞĐŽƵƌƚƐǁŚŝĐŚĂĐƚƚŽƵƉŚŽůĚƚŚĞůĂǁ ? ?18  
Second, it is the UK Supreme Court, and not the Scottish Parliament, that has the final word 
on whether an Act of the Scottish Parliament is law. Indeed, Lord Neuberger, the President of the 
Supreme Court, has said that this power over devolved competence bestows upon that court some 
ŽĨƚŚĞĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐƚŝĐƐŽĨĂĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůĐŽƵƌƚ ?:ƵƐƚĂƐŝŶĂĐŽƵŶƚƌǇǁŝƚŚĂĐŽĚŝĨŝĞĚĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ “ƚŚe 
Supreme Court (as in the US) or the Constitutional Court (as in Germany) can, indeed must, strike 
down legislation which has been enacted by the democratically elected parliament if the court 
concludes that the legislation does not comply with the ConstiƚƵƚŝŽŶ ? ?ŚĞƐĂŝĚ ?ƐŽƚŽŽƚŚĞ^ƵƉƌĞŵĞ
Court must strike down any legislation that has passed through the democratically elected devolved 
legislatures if the Court concludes that it falls outwith legislative competence as defined in statute.19 
Third, officials across the Scottish Government, the Scottish Parliament and the UK Government 
confirmed to us that their method for assessing competence is driven by the devolution 
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court. In this way judicial norms might impact upon Bills as they pass 
                                                          
15 J Hiebert and J Kelly, Parliamentary Bills of Rights: The Experiences of New Zealand and the United Kingdom 
(2015) 1-6. 
16 Imperial Tobacco, Petitioner [2012] CSIH 9, 2012 SC 297 at paras 58 and 71 per Lord Reed. 
17 B Crick and D Millar, To Make the Scottish Parliament a Model for Democracy (1991) 9. 
18 Whaley v Watson 2000 SC 340 at 349 per Lord Rodger. 
19 Lord EĞƵďĞƌŐĞƌ ? “dŚĞh<ŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂů^ĞƚƚůĞŵĞŶƚĂŶĚƚŚĞh<Ƶ^ƉƌĞŵĞŽƵƌƚ ? ? ? ?KĐƚŽďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ?ƐƉĞĞĐŚĂƚ
the Legal Wales Conference 2014, available at https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-141010.pdf.  
  
through the policy development, pre-introduction and parliamentary stages even if the resulting 
legislation is never made subject to a legal challenge.20 
/Ŷ^ƚĞƉĞŚĞŶ'ĂƌĚďĂƵŵ ?ƐĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ ?this factor alone  W that the Supreme Court has the final say on 
the legality of legislation  W would be sufficient to exclude the Scotland Act scheme from this so-
called  “ƚŚŝƌĚǁĂǇ ? ?WĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƌĞƚĞŶƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞůĂƐƚǁŽƌĚŝƐ ?ĨŽƌ'ĂƌĚďĂƵŵ ?ƚŚĞĚefining feature of 
what he labels as ƚŚĞ “EĞǁŽŵŵŽŶǁĞĂůƚŚŵŽĚĞůŽĨĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵ ? ?21 In our view, however, it is 
the reporting obligation and the impact that this has on legislative decision-making that 
distinguishes the  “ƚŚŝƌĚ ǁĂǇ ? ŝŶ Ă ǁĂǇ ƚŚĂƚ ĐĂƉƚƵƌĞƐ ůĂǁ-making in the Scottish Parliament. The 
Scotland Act 1998 is fitted with mechanisms that were designed to enhance the legislative review of 
every Bill for legislative competence. Some of these mechanisms  W the reporting obligation placed 
on the sponsoring Minister and the significant role given to the SĐŽƚƚŝƐŚ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ>ĂǁKfficers  W 
are typical of these models. In addition to internal checks by the executive, however, the 
mechanisms for legislative review are strengthened in the devolved setting by external cross-checks 
ŽŶƚŚĞ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝve agenda both by the Parliament, through the simultaneous reporting 
requirement placed on its Presiding Officer, and by the UK Government, whose Law Officers engage 
with questions of legislative competence before a Bill is submitted for Royal Assent.      
(2) The role of the Scottish Government 
Upon the introduction of a Bill, section 31(1) of the Scotland Act requires the responsible Minister to 
report to the Scottish Parliament his or her view that it would be within legislative competence. The 
purposes of this provision are simultaneously inward and outward facing. On the one hand the 
ŵŝŶŝƐƚĞƌŝĂů ƌĞƉŽƌƚŝŶŐ ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚ ƐĞƌǀĞƐ ƚŽ ĞŶƐƵƌĞ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ^ĐŽƚƚŝƐŚ 'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ  “ŚĂƐ ƉƌŽƉĞƌůǇ
ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚ ƚŚĞ ŝƐƐƵĞ ĂŶĚ ŵĂĚĞ Ă ƉƌŽƉĞƌ ũƵĚŐĞŵĞŶƚ ?ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ŵĞĂƐƵƌĞ ŝƐ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƉŽwer and 
ĐŽŵƉĞƚĞŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞ^ĐŽƚƚŝƐŚWĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚ ? ?22 a view, it was said (and so it has proved), that would be 
reached on basis of legal advice (offered by the Scottish Government Legal Directorate (SGLD) and 
by the Lord Advocate).23 On the other hand, it serves to enhance legislative scrutiny, informing 
Parliament so that  W as the Bill makes its way through the chamber - ŝƚƐ ŵĞŵďĞƌƐ ŵĂǇ  “ĂƐŬ
questions about the statement, raise queries as to whether it is entirely correct, and no doubt 
identify particular provisions in the Bill where there may or may not be some doubt as to whether 
ƚŚĞƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶƐůŝĞǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝǀĞĐŽŵƉĞƚĞŶĐĞ ? ?24 
(3) The role of the Scottish Parliament 
In contrast to the Human Rights Act scheme, the operation of which is enhanced by the work of a 
specialist parliamentary committee - the Joint Committee on Human Rights - the ministerial 
reporting requirement contained in the Scotland Act has not been augmented with a specialist 
                                                          
20 &ŽƌĂƌĞǀŝĞǁŽĨƚŚĞ^ƵƉƌĞŵĞŽƵƌƚ ?ƐƌŽůĞŝŶƚŚĞĚĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶƐĞƚƚůĞŵĞŶƚƐĞĞ:^ĂŝƌĚĂŶĚ,ƌŵƐƚƌŽŶŐ ?The 
Supreme Court on Devolution (27 July 2016) House of Commons Library Research Paper 07670, available at 
http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-7670. 
21 Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism (n 13). 
22 HL Deb 28 July 1998, col 1353 per Baroness Ramsay of Cartvale. 
23 Ibid, col 1350 per Lord Mackay of Drumadoon. 
24 Ibid. 
  
committee tasked with scrutinising Bills for legislative competence.25 Instead, we were told that 
legislative competence is ĞǀĞƌǇŽŶĞ ?Ɛbusiness, and for this reason (as well as for the workload 
implications for already stretched MSPs) little appetite was shown by Government or Parliament 
officials for the streamlining of competence considerations through a specialist committee.26 Rather, 
Parliament most directly engages with the question of competence through its Presiding Officer who 
at the introduction of a Bill must also report on the question of legislative competence. 
 dŚŝƐĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶŝƐƵŶŝƋƵĞƚŽ ?ĂůďĞŝƚƚŚĂƚŝƚĚŝĨĨĞƌƐƐůŝŐŚƚůǇĂĐƌŽƐƐ ?ƚŚĞh< ?ƐĚĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶƐĐŚĞŵĞƐ ?
Its purposes, as set out by Lord Sewel  W the Minister of State in the Scottish Office responsible for 
steering the Scotland Bill through the House of Lords  W are again two-fold. On the one hand, it serves 
ƚŽ ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞ WĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚ ǁŝƚŚ  “ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ ŐƵŝĚĂŶce about the competence of the PĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚ ? ƚŚĂƚ
might serve to inform the subsequent scrutiny of a Bill. On the other, it provides the Presiding 
KĨĨŝĐĞƌǁŝƚŚĂŶŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚǇ “ƚŽĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŚŝƐĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐ ?ƚŽWĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚand to the Government] if he has 
ĂŶǇ ? ?27 As with the ministerial reporting requirement the view of the Presiding Officer is reached on 
the basis of legal advice, in this instance offered by the Office of the Solicitor to the Scottish 
WĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚ  ?K^^W ?ǁŚŽƐĞƌŽůĞ ŝƚ ŝƐĂůƐŽ ? ŝŶƚĞƌĂůŝĂ ?ƚŽƐƵƉƉŽƌƚƚŚĞǁŽƌŬŽĨƚŚĞ^ĐŽƚƚŝƐŚWĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ
various committees.     
(4) The role of the Law Officers 
Legislative review in the Scottish Parliament is further enhanced by the statutory function of the Law 
KĨĨŝĐĞƌƐ ǁŚŽ ? ĚƵƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ƐƚĂƚƵƚŽƌǇ ĨŽƵƌ ǁĞĞŬ ƉĞƌŝŽĚ ƚŚĂƚ ĨŽůůŽǁƐ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŵƉůĞƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ Ă ŝůů ?Ɛ
parliamentary stages, may refer a question of competence directly to the Supreme Court.28 If no 
reference is made, or if the Court upholds the validity of the legislation, the Bill will then be 
submitted for Royal Assent. Whilst superficially this might strengthen the view that the devolution 
scheme is a model of judicial supremacy  W here, after all, is a direct and potentially fatal route for 
legislation to find its way before the Supreme Court  W the consequence of the Court holding that a 
Bill is not within competence is to return the question to the legislative process. In this situation the 
Parliament must be given the opportunity to reconsider the Bill in light of the CŽƵƌƚ ?ƐĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶĂŶĚƚŽ
make such amendments as might be necessary in order to bring it within competence.29 This is no 
 “ŶŽƚǁŝƚŚƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ĐůĂƵƐĞ ? (the power of the legislature to temporarily pre-empt or set aside the 
effects of otherwise binding judicial rulings, as seen in section 33 of the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms): the Scottish Parliament has no power explicitly to legislate outwith competence at 
the reconsideration (nor at any other) stage; and the amended Bill might itself be referred to the 
Court if competence concerns persist. Nevertheless, by putting the Court in dialogue with Parliament 
before the Bill is enacted, the reference procedure intends (although this has yet to be tested in 
practice) to enhance the role of the legislature in the exercise of its scrutiny function. 
(5) Westminster factors 
                                                          
25 In the fifth session (2016-2021) what was previously the Finance Committee has taken on an additional 
constitutional brief, and has been renamed the Finance and Constitution Committee. 
26 &ŽƌĂĐƌŝƚŝƋƵĞŽĨƚŚŝƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƐĞĞĚĂŵƐŽŶ ? “dŚĞƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨŚƵŵĂŶƌŝŐŚƚƐŝŶƚŚĞůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝǀĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŝŶ
^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ ?ŝŶD,ƵŶƚ ?,,ŽŽƉĞƌĂŶĚWzŽǁĞůů ?Parliaments and Human Rights: Redressing the Democratic 
Deficit (2015) ch 13. 
27 HL Deb 9 Nov 1998, col 532. 
28 SA 1998 s33. 
29 SA 1998 s36(4). 
  
Models of legislative review seek to embed in Westminster systems the duty to think politically 
about constitutional boundaries within and across institutions. However, there are reasons inherent 
to that form of government to be cautious about their transformative potential. These 
 “tĞƐƚŵŝŶƐƚĞƌ ? factors include executive dominance of parliament and the centrality of political 
parties in structuring how parliament votes. On the one hand, members of a governing party vote in 
a cohesive manner and only infrequently vote against their party at levels significant enough to harm 
ƚŚĞƉĂƐƐĂŐĞŽĨƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝǀĞĂŐĞŶĚĂ ?KŶƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌ ?ŽƉƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƉĂƌƚǇůĞĂĚĞƌƐƚǇƉŝĐĂůůǇ
do not embrace the merits of a compatibility-based framework as part of their strategic arsenal.30 
Thus, governments have incurred weak pressure from parliament to explain how or why they 
believe Bills overstep constitutional boundaries; a failure all the more significant because of 
ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐ ? ĂƉƉĂƌĞŶƚ ǁŝůůŝŶŐŶĞƐƐ ƚŽ ƉƌŽĐĞĞĚ ǁŝƚŚ ůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝŽŶ that advisers indicate might face a 
high risk of judicial censure.31 
Moreover, the norms implicit in the statutory reporting obligation have not yet displaced 
ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐ ? ŵŽƌĞ ŝŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞ ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ŝƐ ŚŽǁ ƚŽ ƉƌŽƚĞĐƚ ƚŚĞŝƌ ůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝǀĞ ĂŐĞŶĚĂƐ ĨƌŽŵ
parliamentary delay, substantive amendments, or defeat. Acknowledging that a Bill oversteps the 
mark could enhance pressure to accept legislative amendments, which can weaken compromises 
that have already been undertaken within and across party lines, wreak havoc in an already crowded 
parliamentary agenda, and portray the government as weak for having been seen to give in to 
opposition pressures.32 
ĞƐƉŝƚĞƚŚĞŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ^ĐŽƚƚŝƐŚWĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚǁŽƵůĚďĞ “ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ ?ĨƌŽŵtĞƐƚŵŝŶƐƚĞƌ W 
indeed, that Westminster ǁŽƵůĚďĞĂ “ŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞŵŽĚĞů ?ĨŽƌƚŚĞŶĞǁůĞŐŝƐůĂƚƵƌĞ33  W these constraining 
ĨĂĐƚŽƌƐ ƉĞƌƐŝƐƚ ? /ƚ ŝƐ Ɛƚŝůů ƚŚĞ ĐĂƐĞ ? ĂƐ WĂŐĞ ŚĂƐ ƐĂŝĚ ? ƚŚĂƚ  “tĞƐƚŵŝŶƐƚĞƌ ĂƐƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶƐ ĂďŽƵƚ ƚŚĞ
ĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞ ŽĨ ůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝǀĞ ƉŽǁĞƌ ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞ ƚŽ ŚŽůĚ ƐǁĂǇ ? ?34 First, the vast majority of Bills and 
amendments passed during the first four parliamentary sessions were introduced by the executive, 
with little evidence yet of the legislative initiative being shared more widely with the Parliament.35 
Second, studies have shown that the coalition (1999-2003; 2003-2007) and minority governments 
(2007-2011) behaved similarly in terms of loyalty, discipline and cohesion to single party majorities 
of the Westminster kind, before the election of a single party majority in the fourth session (2011-
2016).36 Finally, during the course of our interviews we were repeatedly told that Ministers and 
backbench or opposition MSPs rarely second guess the legal assessments of competence made by 
legal advisers and, where competence issues do arise during the process of legislative scrutiny, see 
strategic value in reframing those into broader policy concerns.  
 As our research will demonstrate, the combined effects of deference by political actors to 
the assessments made by legal advisers, the political context in which these legal assessments are 
                                                          
30 dŚĞĞǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŝƐƚŚĞ,ŽƵƐĞŽĨ>ŽƌĚƐŝŶƚŚĞh< ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ŝƚƐŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞŝƐĚŝŵŝŶŝƐŚĞĚďǇƚŚĞ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ
willingness and ability to call upon disciplined voting of its members in the Commons to defeat amendments 
the Government opposes.  See Hiebert & Kelly, Parliamentary Bills of Rights (n 15) 343-344. 
31 ibid, 286-288. 
32 ibid. 
33 See BK Winetrobe, Realising the Vision: A Parliament with a Purpose (2001) 12. 
34 A Page, Constitutional Law of Scotland (2015) 201. 
35 Page, Constitutional Law (n 34) 201-202.  
36 ŝďŝĚ ? ? ? ? ?WĂŝƌŶĞǇ ? “ŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶĂŶĚŵŝŶŽƌŝƚǇŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚŝŶ^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ PůĞƐƐŽŶƐĨŽƌƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ<ŝŶŐĚŽŵ ? ?
(2011) 82(2) PQ 261. 
  
made and the prevalence of so-ĐĂůůĞĚ  “tĞƐƚŵŝŶƐƚĞƌ ? factors in the devolved legislature is to 
supplant legislative review with something qualitatively different: a form of bureaucratic review.37 
dŚŝƐŝƐƚŽƐĂǇƚŚĂƚĚĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ?ƐĐŽŶstitutional boundaries are primarily tested and protected not by 
the legislature but by the iterative processes that take place between officials at the various check 
points for legislative competence, conducted behind closed doors and under a veil of legal 
confidentiality. It is to our empirical examination of these processes that we now turn.   
C. The Scottish Government 
As with the requirement that UK Ministers report to Parliament on ECHR compatibility, the section 
31 requirement tŚĂƚ “ƚŚĞƉĞƌƐŽŶŝŶĐŚĂƌŐĞ of a Bill shall, on or before introduction, state that in his 
view the provisions of the Bŝůů ǁŽƵůĚ ďĞ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ƚŚĞ ůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝǀĞ ĐŽŵƉĞƚĞŶĐĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ WĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚ ?38 
serves to focus the minds of Scottish Ministers, their political advisers and officials on the question 
of competence at an early stage. With one proviso (to be discussed below, in relation to the role of 
ƚŚĞ >ŽƌĚ ĚǀŽĐĂƚĞ ? ? ƚŚĞ ĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚƐ ǁŚŝĐŚ ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ƚŚĞ DŝŶŝƐƚĞƌƐ ? ƌĞƉŽƌƚŝŶŐ ŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ĂƌĞ ŶŽƚ
centralised. The exercise of competence vetting falls primarily on two of three legal offices: SGLD 
ĂŶĚƚŚĞ>ĞŐĂů^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌŝĂƚ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ>ŽƌĚĚǀŽĐĂƚĞ ?dŚĞƚŚŝƌĚ ?WĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚĂƌǇŽƵŶƐĞů ?ƐKĨĨŝĐĞ  ?WK ? ? ŝƐ
not formally responsible for ensuring that Bills are within legislative competence.39 However, with a 
small team of lawyers (many of whom have previously been employed within SGLD) who work on a 
large number of Bills, PCO has developed a keen instinct for competence issues. Whilst officials there 
stressed that judgement about how best to resolve those issues lies with SGLD, PCO has brought 
that experience to bear by offering advice in relation to individual Bills. We were told that this 
additional perspective has been particularly valuable where a competence issue has been missed, or 
where experience of recurring issues (particularly in relation to Convention rights) and how those 
have previously been resolved can be put to use in relation to current Bills.  
(1) The Scottish Government Legal Directorate  
Unlike Westminster, which operates in sessions of approximately one year and with a 12 month time 
limit on the passage of legislation, the Scottish Parliament operates in sessions of four years,40 with 
no annual cut off. It was said that this elongated parliamentary session would allow for greater 
flexibility within the GovĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝǀĞ ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞ ? ǁŽƵůĚ ĞŶĐŽƵƌĂŐĞ ďĞƚƚĞƌ ƐĐƌƵƚŝŶǇ ŽĨ
legislation, and would avoid the loss of important Bills at the end of each parliamentary year.41 In 
practice, however, the Scottish Government has followed the UK Government ?Ɛ ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ŽĨ 
ĂŶŶŽƵŶĐŝŶŐŝƚƐůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝǀĞƉůĂŶĂŶŶƵĂůůǇ ?dŚŝƐ ?ŝƚŚĂƐďĞĞŶĂƌŐƵĞĚ ?ŝƐ “ĂƵƐĞĨƵůĚŝƐĐŝƉůŝŶĞ ?ƉƌŽǀŝĚŝŶŐĂŶ
opportunity to take stock of what has been achieved in the year just ended and what is planned for 
ƚŚĞ ŶĞǆƚ ǇĞĂƌ ? ?42 but it has also been criticised on ƚŚĞ ďĂƐŝƐ ƚŚĂƚ ŝƚ  “ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐ Ă ĚĞƐŝƌĞ ƚŽ ŽďƚĂŝŶ
                                                          
37 &ŽƌŵŽƌĞŽŶƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨďƵƌĞĂƵĐƌĂƚŝĐƌĞǀŝĞǁƐĞĞE^'ĂůĞŝŐŚ ? “EĞŝƚŚĞƌůĞŐĂůŶŽƌƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ?Bureaucratic 
ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵŝŶ:ĂƉĂŶĞƐĞůĂǁ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?KLJ 193, citing the classic account given by NE Long, 
 “ƵƌĞĂƵĐƌĂĐǇĂŶĚŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?APSR 808. 
38 Scotland Act 1998 s 31(1). 
39 Page, Constitutional Law (n 34) 207. 
40 In order to avoid a conflict with the scheduled 2020 UK General Election the Scottish Elections (Dates) Act 
2016 made provision for a five year Scottish Parliament session, ending in 2021. At the time of writing there 
are no plans to return to the regular four year session despite the earlier than anticipated UK General Election 
taking place in June 2017.   
41 Page, Constitutional Law (n 34) 204. 
42 ibid.  
  
ůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝŽŶ ĂƐ ƋƵŝĐŬůǇ ĂƐ ƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ ? Ăƚ ƚŚĞ ĐŽƐƚ ŽĨ  “ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞĚ ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŽŶ ? ŵŽƌĞ ĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞ ƐĐƌƵƚŝŶǇ ?
ĂŶĚ ?ƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞůǇ ? ‘ďĞƚƚĞƌ ?ůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?43 As Alan Page has said: 
dŚĞ ĂďƐĞŶĐĞ ŽĨ ůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝǀĞ  ‘ƐƵĚĚĞŶ ĚĞĂƚŚ ?as practised at 
tĞƐƚŵŝŶƐƚĞƌ ?ĚŽĞƐ ŶŽƚ ŵĞĂŶ ƚŚĂƚ ůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝŽŶ ĚŽĞƐ ŶŽƚ ŐĞŶĞƌĂƚĞ ŝƚƐ ŽǁŶ
pressures for delivery  W from politicians who may be impatient for results 
and hence critical of what may seem an unnecessarily complex and time 
consuming process.44 
Whilst there is no formal check on legislative competence built into the construction of that 
programme the pressure of time has had a significant effect on the vetting process. Despite the 
intention that the reporting obligation would require political actors to engage seriously with the 
question of vires we were told that, in practice, legislative competence does not rank highly in the 
order of DŝŶŝƐƚĞƌƐ ? priorities. This is because concerns about competence tend not to frustrate policy 
objectives themselves (something which would attract the close attention of Ministers) but are more 
likely to relate to the ways in which those objectives can be implemented. For Scottish Ministers a 
more immediate and pragmatic concern is to get policy onto the statute book, and to do so without 
causing disruption to the legislative programme. Two consequences flow from this. First, political 
actors and policy officials will rarely engage directly in the process of competence vetting: this task is 
legally driven by officials within SGLD. An exception to this might be where a Bill presents obvious 
difficulties from an early stage. In those circumstances policy officials will work closely with senior 
lawyers within SGLD, the Legal Secretariat to the Lord Advocate and PCO to ensure that the issue is 
addressed in sufficient detail, which failing (and this only exceptionally) a Bill might be withdrawn 
from the queue for introduction. Second, where serious concerns about competence do arise, we 
were told that Ministers and their Special Advisers tend to be risk-averse, conceding (in the view of 
some officials, too readily) on contested provisions of a Bill so as to insulate the overall policy 
objective from queries about competence that could require additional changes, alter the 
GovernmeŶƚ ?ƐƉŽůŝĐǇĂŐĞŶĚĂŽƌĚĞůĂǇƚŚĞŝůů ?ƐŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ?
There is, then, an expectation across Government directorates to think about and address 
competence issues (and in particular the reserved/devolved and ECHR boundaries) as policy is being 
formulated. Again, there are two important consequences that flow from this. First, Government 
lawyers have a significant role to play in the policy-making process by advising policy officials as to 
how objectives can be delivered in a manner that is within the legislative competence of the 
Parliament. Second, the influence of Government lawyers at this stage serves to incorporate judicial 
norms within the process of legislative decision-making. The advice given to Ministers is based on a 
risk-assessment of whether  W in light of the relevant jurisprudence - legislation is more likely than 
not to survive a legal challenge in the Supreme Court. If the answer is yes then the Minister will be 
advised that a Bill can be reported to Parliament as being within competence.  
It is ultra vires for Scottish Ministers knowingly to introduce legislation into the Parliament 
that is outwith legislative competence and so legal advice weighs heavily in the mix of relevant 
considerations. As one official put it, ƚŚĞ  “ŶŽƚ ůĂǁ ? ƚĞƐƚ ĂĐƚƐ ĂƐ Ă ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚ ĐŽŶƐƚƌĂŝŶƚ ŽŶ ǁŚĂƚ
Ministers can and cannot do. Nevertheless, some elements of risk-taking endure. On the one hand, a 
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 “ŵŽƌĞůŝŬĞůǇƚŚĂŶŶŽƚ ?ƚĞƐƚŐƌĂŶƚƐto political actors the benefit of the doubt in  “close call ? situations. 
On the other hand, we were told that - as compared to the position in England & Wales - the smaller 
size of the Bar, the relatively infrequent use that is made of judicial review,45 and the existence of 
fewer interest groups with the money or ability to raise a challenge might encourage political actors 
(though, it was stressed, not legal advisers) to take risks in those (very rare) situations where a 
provision is thought to sail close the boundary but where a post-legislative challenge appears to be 
unlikely. What prevents the Scottish Government from overstepping the mark here, we were told, is 
the role played by the Lord Advocate.      
(2) The Lord Advocate 
ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ DŝŶŝƐƚĞƌŝĂů ŽĚĞ ? Ă ŝůů  “ŵƵƐƚ ?ďĞ ĂĐĐŽŵƉĂŶŝĞĚ ďǇ a statement, which will have 
been cleared with the Law Officers, that the Bill is within the legislative competence of the Scottish 
WĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚ ? ?46 In practice we were told that Ministers will defer to the judgement of the Lord 
Advocate. In order for the Law Officers to advise Scottish Ministers on competence issues, a draft Bill 
and a detailed note on legislative competence will be sent to the Legal Secretariat to the Lord 
Advocate (LSLA) (as well as to OSSP and to OAG) three weeks prior to introduction. This note will 
ĂƐƐĞƌƚ^'> ?ƐǀŝĞǁƚŚĂƚĂŝůůŝƐǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞĐŽŵƉĞƚĞŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞWĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚ ?ĂŶĚǁŝůůĨŽƌŵƚŚĞďĂƐŝƐŽĨ
ƚŚĞ >^> ?Ɛ ŽǁŶ ĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚ ? dŚŝƐ ĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚ ŝƐ ŶĞŝƚŚĞƌ Ă ƉĞƌĨƵŶĐƚŽƌǇ ƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚ ŶŽƌ Ă ŵĞƌĞ
formality. Frequently it will require iteration between LSLA and SGLD, typically where more 
explanation or clarity is needed in relation to specific provisions rather than the legislation as a 
whole. In rare circumstances, and in order for a certificate to be issued, action might be required on 
the part of SGLD to amend a Bill where serious concerns persist. Whilst on occasion there might be 
some pushback from SGLD in relation to the concerns expressed by LSLA we were told (1) that when 
the Lord Advocate reaches a view that is the end of the matter, and (2) that it is highly unlikely that 
Ministers themselves will push back against that view. Even where the Minister is noticeably 
unhappy about advice, and even where a hole is left in an important policy, it was said that Ministers 
will take the advice of the LŽƌĚĚǀŽĐĂƚĞ “ŽŶƚŚĞĐŚŝŶ ? ? 
With regard to the test applied by the LSLA, officials were reluctant to identify a particular 
standard, but instead emphasized two important considerations that involve different forms of risk 
assessment. First, in relation to the specific boundaries set out in the Scotland Act, a Bill is assessed 
in light of its consistency with principles derived from relevant Supreme Court jurisprudence. 
Second, based on a civil (balance of probabilities) standard, an assessment is made of how the 
Supreme Court would be likely to rule on the Bill in the event of a legal challenge. Officials told us 
that, for LSLA, the likelihood (or not) that a Bill might later be the subject of a post-legislative 
challenge by a private party is not a feature of this risk assessment: this, it was said, would fly in the 
face of the principle of government according to law. On the contrary, we were told that the Lord 
Advocate would see it as a resigning matter where Ministers were knowingly to introduce legislation 
that is outwith competence. Several reasons were offered as to why this would be the case: first, a 
genuinely held belief that government is and ought to be subject to the rule of law; second, the 
independence imbued in the office holders by their previous careers as prosecutors or  W as is 
currently the case  W as a former Dean of the Faculty of Advocates; third, the continuing professional 
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46 Scottish Government, Ministerial Code (2016) para 3.3 (emphasis added). 
  
integrity of those office holders, who might wish to pursue careers at the Bar or on the bench after 
they demit office. Indeed, officials across the relevant institutions pointed to the influence, the 
independence and the integrity of the Lord Advocate, as well as to the damaging political impact 
that would follow any such resignation, as a significant internal check on the introduction of an ultra 
vires Bill.          
D. The Scottish Parliament 
 
(1) The Presiding Officer 
In addition to the responsible Minister, section 31 also requires the Presiding Officer to report to 
Parliament his or her view as to whether or not a Bill is within competence. Where the Presiding 
Officer reaches the view that a Bill is intra vires Ă “ƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞĐĞƌƚŝĨŝĐĂƚĞ ? W a short written statement to 
that effect - ǁŝůůďĞŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞŝůů ?ƐĂĐĐŽŵƉĂŶǇŝŶŐĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚƐ ?tŚĞƌĞƚŚĞŽƉƉŽƐŝƚĞĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶis 
ƌĞĂĐŚĞĚĂ “ŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞĐĞƌƚŝĨŝĐĂƚĞ ?ǁŝůůŝŶƐƚĞĂĚďĞŝƐƐƵĞĚ ?/ŶƚŚĞĞǀĞŶƚŽĨĂŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞĐĞƌƚŝĨŝĐĂƚĞ ?ĂŶĚonly 
in the event of a negative certificate) this statement must also include the reasons for that decision. 
These are not expansive, identifying only the boundary or boundaries that have been crossed 
without revealing the legal advice that supports that view.  
The Presiding Officer does not exercise a power of veto over the introduction of legislation. 
It is perfectly competent to introduce  W and for Parliament to pass  W a Bill notwithstanding a 
negative certificate. At the time of writing the Presiding Officer has issued four negative certificates, 
Ăůů ŝŶ ƌĞƐƉĞĐƚ ŽĨ DĞŵďĞƌƐ ? ŝůůƐ ? KĨ ƚŚŽƐĞ ? ƚǁŽ  W the Civil Appeals (Scotland) Bill 2006 and the 
Provision of Rail Passengers (Scotland) Bill 2006 - fell at stage 1, the lead subject committee having 
recommended that the Parliament should not agree to the general principles of the Bill.  One  W the 
Criminal Sentencing (Equity Fines) (Scotland) Bill 2008 - was withdrawn.  The last (which was notable 
ĨŽƌƚŚĞŵŽƌĞĚĞƚĂŝůĞĚƌĞĂƐŽŶƐǁŚŝĐŚĂĐĐŽŵƉĂŶŝĞĚƚŚĞWƌĞƐŝĚŝŶŐKĨĨŝĐĞƌ ?ƐĐĞƌƚŝĨŝĐĂƚĞ ?  W the Footway 
Parking and Double Parking (Scotland) Bill 2015  W was supported at stage 1 (albeit the lead 
committee did flag concerns about legislative competence)47 but ran out of time. A negative 
certificate, then, may not prevent the introduction of a Bill, but it does mark the start of a rocky 
legislative path to Royal Assent which has not yet been successfully navigated.  
In order to assist the Presiding Officer in the exercise of this function a convention has emerged 
whereby OSSP will receive, from SGLD, a draft Bill and a note on legislative competence three weeks 
prior to introduction. In the event of a government Bill this will, more often than not, be the same 
note that is sent to the Lord Advocate (and, as we shall see, to OAG), though we were told that there 
may be (very rare) occasions when the Lord Advocate will be afforded the benefit of an expanded 
note. At this point solicitors within OSSP will begin to make their own assessment of whether or not 
a Bill is within competence. Whilst we were told that the note on competence is a useful point of 
reference, the starting point for OSSP is to read the Bill (and the supporting policy memorandum) on 
ŝƚƐ ŽǁŶ ŵĞƌŝƚƐ ? dŚŝƐ ? ŝƚ ǁĂƐ ƐĂŝĚ ? ĂǀŽŝĚƐ ƚŚĞ ƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂů ĨŽƌ K^^W ?Ɛ ǀŝĞǁ ƚŽ ďĞ ƚĂŝŶƚĞĚ ďǇ ƚŚĞ
assessments already made by SGLD and maximises the opportunity for OSSP to spot and to raise 
competence concerns that might have been missed during the GŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂů ǀĞƚƚŝŶŐ
process.    
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During the three week period  W and on the basis of this initial assessment - OSSP will engage in 
an iterative process with SGLD that (1) will inform their recommendation to the Presiding Officer, 
and (2) might lead to changes being made to potentially problematic legislation in order to satisfy 
concerns raised by the Presiding Officer and to achieve a positive certificate.   
(a) Time Constraints 
Officials on both sides described the time constraints of the pre-ŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶƉŚĂƐĞĂƐ “ĐŚĂůůĞŶŐŝŶŐ ?, 
with mixed views as to which side (if either) is disadvantaged as a result. Each of them point to the 
illusory nature of the three week period within which is included weekends, holidays, and the 
constituency days of the Presiding Officer and the responsible Minister. For OSSP there is an 
additional need to build in time for the Presiding Officer to reflect on advice, to seek further 
clarification from legal advisers if necessary, and to reach a view (whilst leaving time for the Scottish 
Government to respond to any feedback that might be offered). The (perhaps inevitable) flip side of 
this is that  W to their frustration - SGLD will often receive feedback from OSSP relatively late in the 
process (perhaps as late as seven days into the pre-introduction period). Where it is clear from an 
early stage that competence issues might arise in relation to a Bill SGLD may choose to engage OSSP 
ŝŶ  “ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚ ƉƌĞũƵĚŝĐĞ ? ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶƐ ĂďŽƵƚ ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐ ƉƌŽďůĞŵĂƚŝĐ ƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶs before the three week 
period kicks in. Moreover, it is possible  W and it has happened  W that where a Bill is particularly 
complex or where competence issues are particularly acute the three week period might be 
extended by the agreement of the parties concerned.   
Some officials suggested to us that the constraints of the three week period work to the 
advantage of OSSP because, as the end of the three week period nears, anxiety about a possible 
negative certificate will often encourage Ministers to err on the side of caution, and to concede to 
ƚŚĞWƌĞƐŝĚŝŶŐKĨĨŝĐĞƌ ?ƐǀŝĞǁ ?^ƵĐŚĐŽŶĐĞƐƐŝŽŶƐŵŝŐŚƚďĞŵĂĚĞďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞ^ĐŽƚƚŝƐŚ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚŚĂƐ
been persuaded of that view. However, and it was suggested more commonly, concessions might 
also be made for risk-averse reasons: to ensure that the successful passage of legislation is not 
derailed or delayed because of subsequent pressure to pass amendments, or because of political 
judgements to preserve political capital for disagreements elsewhere where the stakes might be 
higher.  
Contrary views were also expressed on both sides, however, pointing to the advantage that the 
Government holds by virtue of the time and resources expended on the development of a Bill, as 
compared to the smaller team at OSSP who come to the Bill fresh and from a standing start when it 
is presented to them for pre-introduction scrutiny. What is clear, however, is that the pressures of 
the three week period (felt on both sides) serve to focus minds sharply on the task of achieving a 
positive certificate. With the clock ticking, where serious disagreement continues close to the 
moment of introduction, the Scottish Government is  W by virtue of its three week pre-introduction 
timetable, and by virtue of its political calculation (save in extreme and hitherto not encountered 
circumstances) not to proceed to introduction with a negative certificate - presented with a stark 
choice: to stand down, by amending or withdrawing the offending provision(s), or to face down the 
WƌĞƐŝĚŝŶŐKĨĨŝĐĞƌ ?ƐŽƉƉŽƐŝŶŐǀŝĞw in the hope that he or she will give way.          
(b) Scottish Government Bills 
  
To date, no Scottish Government Bills have been introduced with a negative certificate. However, we 
were told that the GŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ “ĐůĞĂŶďŝůůŽĨŚĞĂůƚŚ ? is a poor indicator of disagreement between 
the Government and the Presiding Officer about legislative competence. 
 An average year will see in the region of 14 Bills introduced into the Parliament. Of these, 
officials told us that one might raise serious concerns about legislative competence, one might be 
ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚƚŽďĞĂ “ĐůŽƐĞĐĂůů ?, and the rest will raise no significant issues beyond perhaps a request 
for further information or clarification. It is rare for SGLD to receive no feedback from OSSP, who 
typically will seek clarity on issues that in their view have not fully been explained in the note on 
legislative competence. The sources of significant disagreement, however, of the sort which might 
ŐŝǀĞƌŝƐĞƚŽ  “ĐůŽƐĞĐĂůůƐ ? or even more serious concerns, include: the absence of case law to guide 
SGLD/OSSP, which then invites differences about the nature or scope of competence concerns; 
differences in the proportionality assessments made by each legal team in relation to Convention 
rights or EU law; disagreement about the necessity or adequacy of safeguards (on the face of or 
extraneous to the Bill) where the Government has taken/created a power; or, attempts by the 
Government to push at the boundary between reserved and devolved matters.  
 We were told that for Scottish Ministers ŝƚ ǁŽƵůĚ ďĞ  “ůĞƐƐ ƚŚĂŶ ŝĚĞĂů ? ĂŶĚ  “ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůůǇ
ĂǁŬǁĂƌĚ ?ƚŽƉƌŽĐĞĞĚƚŽŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚĂŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞĐĞƌƚŝĨŝĐĂƚĞ ?dŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ?ĚĞƐƉŝƚĞƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ
WƌĞƐŝĚŝŶŐKĨĨŝĐĞƌ ?ƐĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶŝƐŵĞƌĞůǇĂview and not a veto on introduction, it was said that in cases 
where there is serious disagreement about legislative competence every effort will be made during 
the three week period to come to a mutually agreeable position. On the Government side this might 
be achieved by making amendments to or withdrawing offending provisions in order to save the 
overall Bill/policy or by making Pepper v Hart statements regarding the exercise of powers in the 
chamber. 
 Government officials offered mixed opinions on this process. Although not a view shared 
across (and, it was stressed, certainly not the view of) the Scottish Government, for some a degree 
ŽĨĨƌƵƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶǁĂƐĞǆƉƌĞƐƐĞĚǁŝƚŚƌĞŐĂƌĚƚŽƚŚĞĨƌĞƋƵĞŶĐǇ ?ƚŚĞŚĞůƉĨƵůŶĞƐƐĂŶĚƚŚĞ  “ƚŽŽ ůĞŐĂůŝƐƚŝĐ ?
ŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨK^^W ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶƐ ?48 whilst others told us that risk averse Ministers (and their political 
advisers) have on occasion been too quick to make concessions not because they were persuaded to 
ƚŚĞ WƌĞƐŝĚŝŶŐ KĨĨŝĐĞƌ ?Ɛ ǀŝĞǁ ďƵƚ ƌĂƚŚĞƌ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ ƌĞĂƐŽŶƐ ŽĨ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ĞǆƉĞĚŝĞŶĐǇ ƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚ ƚŽ ĂďŽǀĞ ?
Indeed, a view was expressed that a more assertive approach against the objections of OSSP might 
have allowed the Government to be bolder in its legislative agenda without crossing the boundary of 
competence.  
 Whilst we were told that it is too strong to say that there now exists a presumption or a 
convention against proceeding with a negative certificate government officials said that they  W and 
                                                          
48 The example offered here is interesting for the way in which the law has developed since these interviews 
ǁĞƌĞĐŽŶĚƵĐƚĞĚ ? “ƚŽŽůĞŐĂůŝƐƚŝĐ ?ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚŽŶƚŚĞƉĂƌƚŽĨK^^WƐĞĞŵĞĚƚŽƌĞůĂƚĞƉƌŝŵĂƌŝůǇƚŽƚŚĞŝƌĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐ
where safeguards against the abuse of power are included in, for example, extraneous guidance rather than 
on the face of legislation. In Christian Institute v Lord Advocate [2016] UKSC 51, 2016 SLT 805  W a challenge to 
ƚŚĞ^ĐŽƚƚŝƐŚ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐEĂŵĞĚWĞƌƐŽŶƐĐŚĞŵĞ- the inadequacy of guidance and the lack of sufficient 
ƐĂĨĞŐƵĂƌĚƐǁĂƐĂĐƌƵĐŝĂůĨĂĐƚŽƌŝŶŚŽůĚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚĂŶǇŝŶƚƌƵƐŝŽŶŝŶƚŽƉƌŝǀĂƚĞĂŶĚĨĂŵŝůǇůŝĨĞǁĂƐŶŽƚ “ŝŶĂĐĐŽƌĚĂŶĐĞ
ǁŝƚŚůĂǁ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌe beyond the competence of the Scottish Parliament (at paras 84-85). As such, a case 
law driven assessment of competence may require closer attention to be paid to the place and robustness of 
any such safeguards.   
  
Ministers  W ǁŽƵůĚ ŚĂǀĞ ƚŽ  “ƚŚŝŶŬ ǀĞƌǇ ĐĂƌĞĨƵůůǇ ? ĂďŽƵƚ ƚŚĞ ŵĞƌŝƚƐ ŽĨƉƌŽĐĞĞĚŝŶŐ ŽŶ ƐƵĐŚ Ă ďĂƐŝƐ
taking into account factors such as the political importance of the policy (including the possibility of 
political and legal challenge in the post-introduction phase), the knock on effect for a tightly 
constructed legislative timetable and the political consequences of an open challenge to the 
Presiding OffŝĐĞƌ ?ƐũƵĚŐĞŵĞŶƚ ? 
 On the Parliament side we were told that officials have quickly to develop an understanding 
of how each Presiding Officer likes to work whilst ensuring at all times that recommendations made 
to them are based on robust evidence and a sound application of the relevant legal principles. 
Parliament officials stressed their respect for the GŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ĚĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐ ŵĂŶĚĂƚĞ ƚŽ ƉĂƐƐ ŝƚƐ
legislation with the consequence that in the case of very close calls - those which might be arguable 
either way, or where a power is capable of being exercised in a way that is intra vires - the benefit of 
the doubt should be afforded to the Government. This political presumption of competence chimes 
ǁŝƚŚĂ  “ƐƚƌŽŶŐ ?49 legal presumption of competence hardwired into the Scotland Act 1998, section 
101 of which places an obligation on Courts, where it is possible to do so, to read Acts of the Scottish 
WĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚ “ĂƐŶĂƌƌŽǁůǇĂƐŝƐƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĚ ?ƚŽďĞǁŝƚŚŝŶĐŽŵƉĞƚĞŶĐĞ ? ?50 Parliament officials (and, as we 
shall see, counterparts in OAG) indicated that when pressed on competence concerns the Scottish 
Government will often  W and not always persuasively  W point to section 101 as something of a 
panacea: that no matter the concern, it will always be possible for the court to  “ƌĞĂĚ ĚŽǁŶ ?
legislation so as to bring it within competence at a later date. This, it was said, might raise issues of 
transparency where the Government claims outwardly to be taking a power to be used in a 
particular (and expansive) way whilst inwardly conceding during the iterative process with OSSP that 
the Court might construe that power much more narrowly. When asked to identify where the 
tipping point might lie (the point at which serious doubt is sufficient to rebut the presumption of 
competence and that a recommendation should be made to the Presiding Officer to issue a negative 
certificate) we were told that officials will put themselves in the shoes of the Supreme Court to 
determine the likely outcome of any legal challenge in light of the evolving devolution jurisprudence 
of the court. Whilst this point has not yet been reached   
 Where there are entrenched views on either side officials told us that there might be  W albeit 
rarely  W an escalation in the disclosure of legal advice: on the one hand, O^^WŵŝŐŚƚƐĞĞŬĐŽƵŶƐĞů ?Ɛ
opinion, whilst on the other it is open to SGLD to reveal that their position has been reached with 
the support of the Lord Advocate (an exception to the convention of legal confidentiality which 
surrounds the advice of the Law Officers).  More routinely, in these contentious cases the areas and 
causes of disagreement will be flagged to the Presiding Officer (we were told that a rule of thumb is 
ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞƐŚŽƵůĚďĞ “ŶŽƐƵƌƉƌŝƐĞƐ ? when it falls finally on OSSP to make their recommendation) who 
might also require a meeting to talk these through with the Solicitor and the Team Leader 
responsible for the relevant Bill. Parliament officials told us that these meetings have often resulted 
in productive and searching questions being asked of OSSP by Presiding Officers who, even where 
they lack legal expertise,51 nevertheless are acutely aware of the political context in which legislation 
is passed and the nuances of the procedural and political hurdles that must be crossed before a Bill 
                                                          
49 DS v HM Advocate [2007] UKPC D1, 2007 SC (PC) 1 at para 24 per Lord Hope. 
50 See Page, Constitutional Law (n 34) 263-264. 
51 Of the five Presiding Officers to date only the first, Sir David Steel, had a background in law, having 
graduated with an LLB from the University of Edinburgh before being elected to the House of Commons in 
1965.  
  
is enacted. Often these discussions will result in further thought and research in order to satisfy the 
WƌĞƐŝĚŝŶŐKĨĨŝĐĞƌƚŚĂƚK^^W ?ƐǀŝĞǁŝƐĐŽƌƌĞĐƚ ?ŽƌƐƚƌŽŶŐůǇĂƌŐƵĂďůĞ ? ?
 As with the Scottish Government, the Presiding Officer is aware that the assessment of 
competence is a legal question made in a political context. Where there exists serious disagreement 
and views have become entrenched OSSP and the Presiding Officer must weigh up the reputation of 
the Presiding Officer and the Parliament which might be damaged by too readily assenting to 
legislation that is later successfully challenged, the political capital to be expended in this or that 
particular disagreement, the democratic mandate held by the Government and the extent to which 
the Bill can satisfactorily be brought within competence during the course of the legislative process. 
So, whilst the frustrations expressed by Government officials above betray the extent to which 
Ministers might back down in the face of disagreement in order to obtain a positive certificate, it is 
also clearly possible for a positive certificate to be issued in circumstances whereby the Presiding 
Officer/OSSP remain of the view that there is an appreciable risk of a later successful challenge but 
have themselves afforded the benefit of the doubt to the GŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐǀŝĞǁ ?
(2) Members of the Scottish Parliament 
It can be seen that  W despite having no hard legal consequences - ƚŚĞWƌĞƐŝĚŝŶŐKĨĨŝĐĞƌ ?ƐƐƚĂƚƵƚŽƌǇ
function has created for the Scottish Parliament a space within which it can meaningfully scrutinise 
Bills for competence and, moreover, intervene at a stage early enough to impact upon the 
legislation. Nevertheless, the dynamics of the pre-introduction period have been criticised both for 
lacking transparency and for having a certain  “ĐŚŝůůŝŶŐ ? ĞĨĨĞĐƚ ŽŶ Ɖarliamentarians themselves. As 
ƌƵĐĞĚĂŵƐŽŶŚĂƐƐĂŝĚ ?  “ƚŚĞƌĞŵĂǇďĞĂƌŝƐŬƚŚĂƚ ŝƚŽĨĨĞƌƐĂ ĨĂůƐĞƐĞŶƐĞŽĨƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ƚŽD^WƐǁŚŽ
may rely on the statement of competence, without having the benefit of seeing the legal advice 
whiĐŚ ǁŝůů ŚĂǀĞ ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂů ƌŝƐŬƐ ? ?52 As we have seen, effective legislative review requires 
that parliamentarians themselves are willing to make critical assessments of competence on its own 
terms. It is difficult to imagine how MSPs can engage in meaningful legislative review without the 
means to assess the reasons why the Presiding Officer has issued a positive certificate (which is 
unaccompanied by reasons) or a negative certificate (accompanied only by very limited reasons). 
This is all the more urgent in the context of a Parliament in which questions of competence are 
mainstreamed rather than being channelled through specialist committees dedicated to, and well 
versed in, the task of scrutinising these assessments.     
 tŚŝůƐƚ ƚŚĞƌĞ ŚĂǀĞ ďĞĞŶ ĞǆĂŵƉůĞƐ ŽĨ ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů D^WƐ ŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐŝŶŐ DĞŵďĞƌƐ ? ŝůůƐ
notwithstanding a negative certificate, we were told that parliamentarians in plenary and in 
committee will rarely second guess the decision reached by the Presiding Officer. The reasons that 
were offered for this were varied. First, it is a rare occurrence for legislative competence to remain a 
live issue at the point that MSPs engage at stage 1. As one Parliament official put it, given that most 
Bills are government Bills that have been subject to processes of internal scrutiny for competence 
(by SGLD, by the Office of the Solicitor/Presiding Officer and by the Law Officers to the Scottish and 
UK Governments) there is a reasonable working assumption that Bills introduced into Parliament will 
ŶŽƚďĞŵĂŶŝĨĞƐƚůǇŝŶĐŽŵƉĞƚĞŶƚ ?/ƚǁŽƵůĚďĞ “ƌĞ-ŝŶǀĞŶƚŝŶŐƚŚĞǁŚĞĞů ? ?ĂŶĚĂƐƐƵĐŚĂŶŝŶĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚƵƐĞ
ŽĨWĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐ ?ƚŽƌĞ-visit or to second guess that scrutiny at stage 1. Second is the legal 
nature of the assessment. Whilst decisions about what action to take in light of an assessment about 
                                                          
52 Adamson (n 26) at 203. 
  
competence are made in a political context, the application of the section 29 tests involve close 
analysis of the Scotland Act and related case law (both from the domestic courts as well as from the 
European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Union), of the sort that is 
likely to be beyond the expertise of most MSPs. So, Scottish Government officials  W who queried 
from where Parliament would source alternative legal advice - suggested that a less binary 
statement on competence might serve only to create more ambiguity for Law Officers and, 
ƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞůǇ ?Ă “ůĂǁǇĞƌ ?ƐƉĂƌĂĚŝƐĞ ? ?ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚŵĂŬŝŶŐĂŶǇŵĞĂŶŝŶŐĨƵů ?ƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞ ?ŝŵƉĂĐƚŽŶƉĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚĂƌǇ
debate. Third, it was suggested by a number of interviewees (and by officials, politicians and advisers 
ĂůŝŬĞ ? ƚŚĂƚ ƚŽ ƐĞĐŽŶĚ ŐƵĞƐƐ ƚŚĞ ŵĞƌŝƚƐ ŽĨ Ă ĐĞƌƚŝĨŝĐĂƚĞ ŵŝŐŚƚ ďĞ ƐĞĞŶ ƚŽ  “ůĂĐŬ ƌĞƐƉĞĐƚ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ
judgement of the Presiding Officer. ?&ŝŶĂůůǇ ?ǁĞǁĞƌĞƚŽůĚƚŚĂƚĨŽƌďĂĐŬďĞŶĐŚĂŶĚŽƉƉŽƐŝƚion MSPs 
the policy implications of a Bill were more salient than the legal question of competence, with two 
ƉŽƐƐŝďůĞĞĨĨĞĐƚƐ PĞŝƚŚĞƌƚŚĂƚŵĞŵďĞƌƐƚĂŬĞƚŚĞ “ĞĂƐǇ ?ŽƉƚŝŽŶŽĨĚĞĨĞƌƌŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞWƌĞƐŝĚŝŶŐKĨĨŝĐĞƌŽŶ
the competence question, or that they will see strategic advantage in reframing a question about 
legislative competence into a question about policy. 
 ,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ĂŶĚĂƐǁĞŚĂǀĞƐĞĞŶ ? ŝŶ  “ĐůŽƐĞĐĂůů ?ƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶƐƚŚĞWƌĞƐŝĚŝŶŐKĨĨŝĐĞƌǁŝůůŐŝǀĞƚhe 
benefit of the doubt to the Government. In other words, on one or two occasions each year, a Bill 
might reach stage 1 with a positive certificate ŶŽƚǁŝƚŚƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐƚŚĞWƌĞƐŝĚŝŶŐKĨĨŝĐĞƌ ?ƐĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚ- 
undisclosed to Parliament - of a tolerable risk that (if unamended) it would not survive judicial 
scrutiny. On theƐĞŽĐĐĂƐŝŽŶƐǁĞǁĞƌĞƚŽůĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞďŝŶĂƌǇŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĞWƌĞƐŝĚŝŶŐKĨĨŝĐĞƌ ?ƐƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚ
of competence, along with the absence of reasons in support of a positive statement, can be a 
source of frustration. This might be alleviated by committees and their clerks being shown more of 
ƚŚĞWƌĞƐŝĚŝŶŐKĨĨŝĐĞƌ ?ƐǁŽƌŬŝŶŐ ?ŝŶƉƵďůŝĐŽƌŽŶĂĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶƚŝĂůďĂƐŝƐ ?ŝŶƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƚŽƉŽƐƐŝďůĞƌŝƐŬĨĂĐƚŽƌƐ
and opportunities for challenge. This, it was said, would serve a dual purpose both of assisting 
committees to identify witnesses who might expand upon and test those risks, and - in so doing - of 
informing public debate (noting that in relation to proportionality cases the inadequacy of public 
debate might itself play into the disproportionality test and therefore give rise to incompatibility).53 
Parliament officials stressed the value of those channels of communication which do exist between 
OSSP and the committees and their clerks, and which are utilised on a case-by-case basis: OSSP 
ŵŝŐŚƚŝŶĨŽƌŵĂůůǇƌĂŝƐĞ “ƌŝƐŬƐ ? to legislative competence (a positive certificate notwithstanding) with 
a stage 1 committee/clerk as a way of pushing those issues onto the legislative agenda, whilst 
committees/clerks might themselves approach OSSP on a confidential basis where they (or their 
witnesses) have identified concerns. However, we were told that a more routine dialogue in relation 
ƚŽ “ĐůŽƐĞĐĂůůƐ ?ŵŝŐŚƚŚĞůƉƚŽĞŶŐĞŶĚĞƌĂŵŽƌĞƌŽďƵƐƚƐĐƌƵƚŝŶǇŽĨŝůůƐďǇůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŽƌƐ ?dŚŝƐ ?ŝƚǁĂƐƐĂŝĚ ?
would help committees to identify areas of risk that could usefully be brought into the public 
debate: first by providing, through the identification of relevant witnesses, alternative sources of 
ĂĚǀŝĐĞ ƚŚĂƚ ŵŝŐŚƚ ĂĨĨŝƌŵ ? ĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞ Žƌ ƋƵĂůŝĨǇ DŝŶŝƐƚĞƌƐ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ WƌĞƐŝĚŝŶŐ KĨĨŝĐĞƌ ?Ɛ ƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚƐ ŽĨ
competence; seconĚ ?ďǇďƌĞĂŬŝŶŐĚŽǁŶƚŚĞ “ďŽƐƐŵĞŶƚĂůŝƚǇ ?ƚŚĂƚƐĞĞƐD^WƐĚĞĨĞƌƚŽŽĞĂƐŝůǇƚŽƚŚĞ
decision of the Presiding Officer. Instead politicians should be encouraged to look behind a positive 
certificate where  W ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶůǇŝŶƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƚŽ “ĐůŽƐĞĐĂůůƐ ? Wthey might discover that a perception of risk 
is shared by a Presiding Officer who has nonetheless been persuaded to grant to the Government 
the benefit of the doubt.  
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E. The Law Officers 
 
(1) The Advocate General for Scotland 
Within the Office of the Advocate General (OAG), legal advisers (themselves drawn from SGLD) will 
address both policy and legal issues that arise as a result of devolution. On the policy side, advisers 
engage with UK Government officials both to ensure that its own legislation is compliant with Scots 
law  ?ǁŚĂƚŽŶĞŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚƚŽĂƐ “ƉƵƚƚŝŶŐĂŬŝůƚ ?ŽŶh<ůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?ĂƐǁĞůůĂƐƚŽĞŶƐƵƌĞƚŚĂƚh< 
Government departments understand how devolved legislation might impact upon UK policies. This 
latter process involves informing the relevant departments about Scottish Parliament Bills, 
highlighting any possible concerns, liaising between Government departments and the Attorney 
'ĞŶĞƌĂů ?ƐŽĨĨŝĐĞ ?ĂŶĚŵĂŬŝŶŐƐƵĐŚƌĞĐŽŵŵĞŶĚĂƚŝŽŶs as are necessary to the Advocate General. The 
ĚǀŽĐĂƚĞ 'ĞŶĞƌĂů ?Ɛ ůĞŐĂů ĂĚǀŝƐĞƌƐ ĂůƐŽ ĨŽĐƵƐ ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂůůǇ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ůĞŐĂů ĚŝŵĞŶƐŝŽŶƐ ŽĨ ĚĞǀŽůǀĞĚ
legislation: advising the Advocate General with regard to their section 33 power. Here, issues might 
arise either as a result of disagreement between the UK and Scottish Governments about the 
competence of a particular Bill or because the limits to competence constrain the Scottish 
Government from pursuing policies to which the UK Government has no objection (in particular 
where there is synergy between the policy interests of both parties). In the former case we were 
told that the possibility of a reference might encourage changes to the Bill that would bring it within 
competence. In the latter case more friendly approaches can be used, in the sense of trying to 
enable rather than to constrain legislative actions. The devolution settlement is an inherently fluid 
one in that it does not prescribe such firm boundaries as to require formal amendments to the 
political settlement as a whole every time legislation or the authorization for new powers is thought 
not strictly to be within competence. Thus section 104 of the Scotland Act 1998 allows for 
consequential modifications to be made to reserved law in order to accommodate Scottish 
legislation, section 30 allows for adjustment of the scope of devolved competence by means of an 
Order-in-Council, whilst the Scottish Parliament might lend its legislative consent to UK legislation in 
devolved areas in order to avoid the risk of legal challenge in politically contentious areas.54 
 &ŽƌŵĂůůǇƚŚĞĚǀŽĐĂƚĞ'ĞŶĞƌĂů ?ƐƐĐƌƵƚŝŶǇĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶ ŝƐĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞĚĂƚƚŚĞĞŶĚŽĨƚŚĞ ůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝǀĞ
process and begins with written notification from the Presiding Officer that a Bill has passed stage 3. 
At this point, during the four week period between the final parliamentary stage and the submission 
of a Bill for Royal Assent, the Advocate General (as well as the Attorney General also on behalf of the 
UK Government and the Lord Advocate on behalf of the Scottish Government) may refer the Bill to 
the Supreme Court in order to obtain a ruling on whether or not the Bill is within the legislative 
competence of the Parliament. In practice, however, OAG receive the same note on legislative 
competence that is sent by the Scottish Government to the Lord Advocate and to the Presiding 
Officer during the three week pre-introduction period and will engage informally with Scottish 
Government counterparts as well as with relevant UK departments at that time. Indeed, we were 
ƚŽůĚ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ  “ŚĞĂǀǇ ůŝĨƚŝŶŐ ? ŝƐ ĚŽŶĞ ĚƵƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ƉƌĞ-introduction ƉĞƌŝŽĚ ǁŚĞŶ Ă  “ĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝǀĞ ĂŶĚ
ůĞŶŐƚŚǇ ĚŝĂůŽŐƵĞ ? ĂďŽƵƚ ĂůŵŽƐƚ ĞǀĞƌǇ ŝůů ǁŝůů ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨǇ ĂŶĚ  ?ŝĨ ƚŚĞ ĚŝĂůŽŐƵĞ ŐŽĞƐ ǁĞůů ? ŝƌŽŶ ŽƵƚ
competence issues that might arise. As a result, it was said ƚŚĂƚ “ƐƵƌƉƌŝƐĞƐ ?ĂƚƚŚĞĞŶĚŽĨƚŚĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ
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^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚƐŝŶĐĞĚĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?PL 501. ^ĞĞĂůƐŽ>ŽƌĚZŽĚŐĞƌ ?ƐĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞŝŶ^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚƉƌĞ- and 
post-devolution in Martin v Most [2010] UKSC 10, 2010 SC (UKSC) 40 at paras 68-74.  
  
(during the four week period)  W be that surprise on the part of the Scottish Government that a 
reference is seriously being considered, or on the part of the UK Government arising, for example, 
from a problematic stage 3 amendment  W are extremely rare. One official described this as a good 
common sense practice, which allows for considerable exchange between OAG officials and their 
SGLD counterparts in order to address problems at the earliest possible stage. In this way, the 
dynamic between SGLD and OAG avoids the pressures of time which may exacerbate tensions 
between the SGLD and OSSP during the three-week period.  Relations with lawyers working on these 
issues for the Scottish Government were characterized as professional and characterised by good 
will on both sides to resolve differences. We were told that generally this approach works well. 
However, if significant differences are not resolved and serious doubts about competence persist, 
the Advocate General will have to make a judgement about whether the issue should be taken to 
the Supreme Court. 
(a) Assessment criteria 
We were told that officials do not frame their advice in scientific or quantitative terms but instead 
exercise judgement (one official told us that counterparts in England & Wales are more likely to use 
a numerical range to convey increasing or decreasing levels of risk). As is the case with SGLD and 
OSSP, this judgement is based on a case-based risk-assessment of the likelihood of a successful legal 
challenge in the Supreme Court and is made in the context of a still developing devolution 
jurisprudence. We were told that disagreement is most likely to arise in  “close call ? situations where 
interpretations of the relevant legal principles or case law do not speak authoritatively to the 
competence issue. Given the absence of any reference to date (more on which below) we were keen 
to discover if the UK Government exercises a degree of deference towards the Scottish 
'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝǀĞ ŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐ ŝŶ these situations. Officials told us that this is not an 
appropriate way to characterize the dynamic. Instead, the context is shaped by a sense of genuine 
commitment to make devolution work in a manner that abides by law. Whilst officials on both sides 
acknowledged that the Scottish Government might on occasion sail close to the boundaries of the 
WĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĐŽŵƉĞƚĞŶĐĞƚŚĞƌĞǁĂƐĂůƐŽĂďƌŽĂĚĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚƚŚĂƚ ŚŝƐƐŽĨĂƌŚĂƐďĞĞŶĨŽƌƌĞĂƐŽŶƐŽĨ
policy (and are resolved on those terms) rather than in order to provoke conflict at the edges of the 
territorial constitution. Put another way: whilst it was agreed that there might be short term political 
capital to be gained for a devolved government (especially one of a nationalist complexion) to 
legislate beyond its limited competence in order to provoke a reaction from the centre, we were told 
that the Scottish Government takes seriously its commitment to the rule of law, that in the case of 
the SNP being seen to be a responsible and competent party of government is preferable to high 
stakes constitutional gamesmanship ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐŽŶďŽƚŚƐŝĚĞƐǀĂůƵĞƚŚĞ “ŵĂƚƵƌĞ ?ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ
that exists between the Scottish and UK Governments at official level (made easier by the cross-
fertilisation of Scottish Government and OAG legal advisers) ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ  “ǀĞƌǇ ŐŽŽĚ ? ƉĞƌƐŽŶĂů
relationships that have existed between the Law Officers themselves.  
 However, it was also suggested that in two important ways the devolution settlement 
favours the Scottish Government and that this must weigh in the assessment as to whether or not to 
issue a reference. First, the Scottish Government will routinely ƌĞůǇ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ĐŽƵƌƚ ?Ɛ ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝǀĞ
obligation in section 101 to assuage concerns that OAG might have about provisions or powers that 
might push the boundaries of legislative competence. For officials in OAG there was some 
discomfort about this, ĨŽƌĂŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨƌĞĂƐŽŶƐ PƚŚĂƚŝƚŝƐ “ƚŽŽĞĂƐǇ ?ƚŽĐůĂŝŵƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ^ƵƉƌĞŵĞŽƵƌƚ
  
would read a provision in a particular way; that it leaves uncertain the scope of a provision or power; 
and, that this uncertainty shifts the burden (and the cost) from the institutions of government to the 
citizen to raise a post-legislative challenge in order to make sense of that uncertainty. Second, UK 
Government officials eǆƉƌĞƐƐĞĚƚŚĞǀŝĞǁƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĐŽƵƌƚ ?ƐũƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞƚĞŶĚƐƚŽĨĂǀŽƵƌƚŚĞƉƵƌƉŽƐĞ
of legislation as put by the proposer of the legislation, where purpose goes to the very heart of the 
statutory test for competence.55      
(b) Lack of a reference 
During the first four sessions there were (and indeed still have been) no references made by either 
the UK or the Scottish Law Officers. This was not inevitable. On the one hand, several officials told us 
that, at its outset, they believed references would be a routine feature of the devolution settlement 
 W a vital forum for dispute resolution in a multi-layered constitution  W and expressed surprise that 
this has not come to pass. Indeed, one senior UK Government official argued that references 
procedure ought still to become normalised. On the other hand, the experience in Wales has been 
quite different. There three references have been made: two in which legislation was upheld 
following a reference by the Attorney General,56 and one in which the Counsel General for Wales 
sought unsuccessfully to affirm competence on behalf of the Welsh Government.57 For these 
reasons we were keen to explore with officials across the Scottish and UK Governments whether it is 
appropriate to draw inferences from the lack of any reference having been made. Specifically, we 
asked how the absence of a reference to date has affected the criteria for assessing competence; 
whether or how the lack of a reference so far impacts upon the utility of the mechanism itself; and, 
whether and to what extent the election of a nationalist government in the Scottish Parliament has 
altered the way in which  “close calls ? are assessed.  
 Responses were generally consistent on whether and how the lack of a reference to date 
impacts on the competence exercise by both the Scottish and UK Governments. The most significant 
points upon which there was agreement were the following: 
x Notwithstanding the absence of any reference to date, the possibility of a reference (and the 
fact that both sides take seriously that the prospect of a reference is a real one) is a useful 
resource which serves to focus minds on both sides to resolve differences during the pre-
legislative/legislative process. 
x The warning of a possible reference is not made lightly and is used when serious differences 
persist about competence during the iterative process that occurs between Scottish and UK 
Government officials.  
x There have been (one official indicated at least three) occasions in which the very real 
prospect of a reference has had the effect of generating amendments that ultimately have 
satisfied the Advocate General that no reference is required. 
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[2012] UKSC 53, [2013] 1 AC 792; Agricultural Sector (Wages) Bill  ? Reference by the Attorney General for 
England and Wales [2014] UKSC 43, [2014] 1 WLR 2622. 
57 Recovery of Medical Costs for Asbestos Diseases (Wales) Bill - Reference by the Counsel General for Wales 
[2015] UKSC 3, [2015] AC 1016. 
  
x Whilst officials could recall no examples of legislation being allowed to pass through OAG 
despite the Scottish Government clearly overstepping the mark there was a feeling that 
some had come close.    
x In those rare instances when a reference is a real possibility there is likely to be an escalation 
to direct engagement between the Law Officers in order to find a resolution. 
x Whilst the reference is a legal mechanism the decision to make a reference is one made in a 
political context. This, we were told, does not alter the assessments made by officials but 
the political costs of making a reference will be weighed by Ministers and by the Law 
Officers themselves. 
Although no reference has been made we were told that the prospect of a reference has been an 
effective means of engaging Scottish Government counterparts in a meaningful dialogue about 
competence. As to why no reference has been made several (often overlapping) reasons were 
offered: 
x Impact. Officials on both sides told us that because the use of the reference had not been 
normalised the passage of time has served to heighten the political impact of any reference 
ƚŚĂƚ ŝƐ ŶŽǁ ŵĂĚĞ ? ^Ž ? ŝŶ ŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁƐ ? ƚŚĞ ƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ǁĂƐ ƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚ ƚŽ ĂƐ Ă  ‘ŶƵĐůĞĂƌ ? ŽƉƚŝŽŶ
which in itself indicates a measure to be used only in extremis. 
x Engagement. Despite some reported disquiet amongst Ministers in the Scottish Government 
about the informal engagement of OAG during the three week pre-introduction period 
officials on both sides agreed that this practice is a productive one which should avoid (and 
so far has avoided) the need to make a reference at a later stage.  
x A blunt instrument. A decision to refer a Bill to the Supreme Court will bar the Presiding 
Officer from submitting that Bill for Royal Assent. We were told that the inability to sever 
offending provisions from the Bill such that the remainder could be submitted for Royal 
Assent might weigh against a reference being made. In other words, the Law Officers will 
have to think carefully about whether it is worth, for example, delaying the passage of a 
complex Bill over one or two provisions that might sail close to the boundary. Whilst a 
ƌĞĐŽŵŵĞŶĚĂƚŝŽŶ ŚĂƐ ďĞĞŶ ŵĂĚĞ ƚŽ  “ƐŚĂƌƉĞŶ ? ƚŚĞ ƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ƚŽů ďǇ ĂůůŽǁŝŶŐ ĨŽƌ
severability,58 pragmatic (how to sever provisions without doing harm to the integrity of the 
Bill) and political (the Scottish Government has so far rejected this recommendation) hurdles 
have yet to be overcome.         
x Political sensitivity. The election during the third and fourth parliamentary sessions of a 
nationalist government in Scotland (and in particular its juxtaposition with a Conservative-
led coalition and then a Conservative majority UK Government) places political strain on the 
reference procedure that might otherwise have been used but for the risk of fanning 
nationalist flames. This, we were told, was particularly true around the time of the Scottish 
Independence Referendum when efforts to engage at an early stage and in a constructive 
ĨĂƐŚŝŽŶǁĞƌĞ  “ƌĞĚŽƵďůĞĚ ? ŝŶŽƌĚĞƌ ƚŽĂǀŽŝĚƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶƐǁŚŝĐŚďƌŽƵŐŚƚ ƚŚĞh<ĂŶĚĚĞǀŽůǀĞĚ
institutions into conflict. Nevertheless, and as we have seen, officials on both sides have 
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stressed that the reference procedure has not become a focal point for short term political 
grandstanding on either side of that broader constitutional debate.   
x Working relationships. At the political level the alignment of a Labour-led coalition in 
Scotland and a Labour Government across the UK during the first two parliamentary sessions 
meant that competence concerns could be addressed relatively easily through informal 
channels between colleagues without recourse to a reference. Additionally, across the civil 
service we were told that the cross-fertilisation of Scottish Government and UK Government 
advisers  W as well as the physical location of an OAG office within Victoria Quay  W has 
allowed for strong and mature relationships to develop and to underpin what can on rare 
occasions become a fraught process.             
x Remoteness. Whilst an interpretation might possibly be made that legislation encroaches 
upon a reserved matter, where that interpretation is strained or where the operation of the 
law in that way appears to be only a remote possibility, OAG might take the view that it 
would be inappropriate to refer the Bill during the four week period. If that remote 
possibility later came to pass it would be open to the possibility of a post-legislative 
challenge by made a third party. 
Put more generally, officials were in agreement that an important part of the explanation for the 
lack of a reference is that the devolution settlement for Scotland represents a sophisticated and 
flexible political relationship that is working effectively. It has multiple points of scrutiny to address 
potential difficulties for competence early in the legislative process; it benefits from high calibre 
professionals who have established good working relationships within government and with their 
inter-governmental counterparts; and, it envisages flexible ways to resolve competence issues. 
(c) Tipping Point 
Given the range of considerations  W legal and political - that influence decisions about whether to 
make a reference, we asked what would be the tipping point in deciding to proceed to the Supreme 
Court. Officials were understandably reluctant to be specific other than to suggest that a warning 
and a decision to proceed with a reference would ultimately require an extremely careful 
assessment of how the Court would be likely to rule. However in the case of very close calls the 
decision would be based on the broader set of considerations discussed above. Where the Advocate 
General is persuaded to afford to the Scottish Government the benefit of the doubt, or where a legal 
assessment is off-set by competing political considerations, officials pointed to the possibility of a 
post-legislative challenge raised by a third party as a final and significant check on vires.  
 Although not yet seriously contemplated, some officials indicated that the threshold for 
making a reference might be lowered in the event of a joint reference by both the UK and Scottish 
Government Law Officers, where the purpose of the reference is to bring certainty to ambiguous 
provisions ? /ŶĚĞĞĚ ? ŝƚ ǁĂƐ ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚŝƐ ŵŝŐŚƚ ďĞ ŽŶĞ ǁĂǇ ŽĨ “ƚĂŬŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ƐƚŝŶŐ ŽƵƚ ? ŽĨ the 
reference mechanism in order to normalise the procedure. However, and as we shall see below, 
given that the risk is most significantly attached to the devolved institutions  W it is their legislation at 
stake  W there seems to be little prospect in the short to medium term that such a reference would be 
sought.            
(2) The Lord Advocate 
  
As discussed above, the Lord Advocate  W supported by legal advisers - will have been engaged in 
assessments of legislative competence, and indeed will have formed a view as to the legislative 
competence of a Bill, long before the commencement of the four week period. Whilst there are 
some (albeit rare) examples of substantial amendments being made very late in the legislative 
process which might carry a Bill outwith competence  W the offending provision in the first successful 
civil challenge to an Act of the Scottish Parliament, Salvesen v Riddel,59 concerned an amendment 
made a stage 3 and therefore out of sight of the pre-introduction scrutiny period - we were told that 
it is unlikely that the Lord Advocate will take a markedly different stance at this stage. Certainly, we 
it was said that the Lord Advocate will not easily yield to a contrary interpretation of legislative 
competence by one of the UK Law Officers even though, as we have seen, discussions between 
advisers to Scottish Government and UK Law Officers (and, if sufficiently serious or urgent, between 
the Law Officers themselves) have from time to time required action by one or both of the parties in 
order to avert a reference from being made. 
 Given (1) the Scottish Parliament ?Ɛ ůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝǀĞ ĚǇŶĂŵŝĐƐ ? ŝŶ ǁŚŝĐŚ ƚŚĞ ǀĂƐƚ ŵĂũŽƌŝƚǇ ŽĨ
legislation and legislative amendments are introduced by the government, (2) the robust discussions 
around competence which take place during the pre-introduction period, and (3) the possibility of a 
reference which filters back into the legislative process at stage 2, it is extremely unlikely that the 
Lord Advocate would ever feel it necessary to make a reference in order to challenge a government 
Bill (though officials did admit that a more likely scenario might be a reference made to challenge a 
DĞŵďĞƌƐ ?ŝůů ? ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƐŽŵĞŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐĚŝĚƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶǁŚǇŝƚǁĂƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ>ŽƌĚĚǀŽĐĂƚĞŚĂƐŶŽƚǇĞƚ
made a reference in order to defend ƚŚĞWĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ůĞgislation. In other words, in circumstances 
where a post-legislative challenge by a third party seems inevitable (it seemed inevitable, for 
example, that legislation affecting  W in their view adversely - the interests of insurers or the tobacco 
or drinks industries would attract litigation), it was suggested that a reference could be made by the 
Lord Advocate during this four week period in order to remove doubt and to protect against the 
damaging material and reputational consequences of such a challenge. 
 During the course of our interviews officials offered a number of reasons as to why this 
option has not yet seriously been considered. The most significant amongst these seemed to be the 
risk factor and the potential impact of any delay on the legislative timetable. On the one hand, legal 
and political advisers to the Lord Advocate and to the Scottish Ministers pointed to the risk of 
exposing a Bill to judicial scrutiny in order to defend a provision or provisions that the Scottish 
Government already belieǀĞƐ ƚŽ ĨĂůůǁŝƚŚŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƐĐŽƉĞŽĨ ƚŚĞWĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƉŽǁĞƌƐ ? /ŶĚĞĞĚ ?ŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐ
pointed to the experience of the Counsel General for Wales - whose view that the Recovery of 
Medical Costs for Asbestos Diseases (Wales) Bill fell within the legislative competence of the Welsh 
Assembly60 was contradicted by an adverse ruling by the Supreme Court61 - as evidence of the risk 
inherent in making such a reference. On the other hand, and as we have seen, the Scottish 
'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝǀĞƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞŝƐďŽƚŚĞǆƚƌĞŵĞůǇƚŝŐŚt and planned 2-3 years in advance. Thus 
officials are wary of any step that might delay the implementation of legislation and of the knock on 
effects that a reference might have for that timetable. With regard to the Recovery of Medical Costs 
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Bill, for example, the Counsel General for Wales wrote to the Chief Executive and the Clerk of the 
Welsh Assembly on December 11th 2013 indicating that he would refer the Bill to the Supreme 
ŽƵƌƚ ?dŚĞĐŽƵƌƚ ?ƐũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚǁĂƐƌĞƚƵƌŶĞĚ some fourteen months later, on February 9th 2015.62     
 In addition, two secondary considerations were offered. First, it was said that whilst some 
challenges are perhaps foreseeable, officials told us that there have been instances when a 
ĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞ ŚĂƐ ďĞĞŶ ƌĂŝƐĞĚ ? Žƌ ŚĂƐ ďĞĞŶ ƚŚƌĞĂƚĞŶĞĚ ?  “ƐĞĞŵŝŶŐůǇ ĨƌŽŵ ŶŽǁŚĞƌĞ ? ? dŚƵƐ ŝƚ ǁĂƐ
suggested that trying to predict the unpredictable  W i.e. to determine which Bills would require to be 
defended in this way - might not make the best use of limited resources and public money. Second, 
whilst officials wĞƌĞ ƋƵŝĐŬ ƚŽ ƉƌĂŝƐĞ ƚŚĞ ƋƵĂůŝƚǇ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ^ƵƉƌĞŵĞ ŽƵƌƚ ?Ɛ ũƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞ ŝƚ ǁĂƐ
suggested that something of practical value would be lost were legislation to be referred directly to 
that forum. This is to say that  W ŝŶƐŽŵĞŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐ ?ǀŝĞǁ Wthe jurisprudence of that court benefits from 
the prior work done by the Outer House and Inner House in post-legislative challenges, defining and 
sharpening the legal issues at stake.      
 When pressed, a fifth factor emerged: political sensitivity. We have seen that for the UK Law 
Officers the nationalist complexion of the Scottish Government has been a factor against making a 
reference, particularly against the background of the 2014 Scottish Independence Referendum. The 
corollary of this for the Lord Advocate is that it might be seen to be politically awkward for an SNP 
Government - one which has been opposed to Scottish civil appeals being decided by a UK court63 - 
proactively to seek to defend its legislation in that forum, via a route which entirely by-passes the 
Scottish courts. Again, here we see the interplay of legal and political factors which shape the way in 
which the discretion of the Law Officers is exercised. 
F. CONCLUSION 
^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ ?Ɛ ĚĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶsettlement offers an interesting case study for those interested in how 
legislative vetting for consistency with constitutional principles impacts on the process of law-
making. On the one hand, the Scottish Parliament shares features in common with those 
Westminster-based systems that have adopted an innovative approach to rights protection: the 
marriage of judicially reviewable constitutional boundaries alongside a statutory obligation on the 
part of the executive to report to parliament where every Bill sits in relation to those boundaries. To 
this extent, the Scottish Parliament shares the fundamental challenge of promoting legislation that is 
consistent with constitutional values within a political environment where legislative judgement is 
influenced by Westminster-factors such as executive domination of parliament, the centrality of 
party in the organisation of how parliament functions and votes, the perpetual attempts of the 
opposition to demonstrate why it is the best alternative to government, and the tendency of party 
discipline to focus debate in binary terms: for or against the government.  Indeed, this research 
underscores the importance of context when evaluating how legal rules and political principles 
influence legislative decision-making. First, the political context cannot be ignored. Judgement about 
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competence is inevitably shaped by ideological assumptions about the role of state, and thus 
opinions may vary within and between political parties, as well as by nationalist and unionist 
assumptions about the very legitimacy of the state. Second, the pressures created by the multiple 
sites of competence vetting are augmented by what we interpret as the preference of the Scottish 
Government to avoid proceeding with a Bill that could garner a negative certificate from the 
Presiding Officer or a reference to the Supreme Court by the UK Government. Thus, while legal 
advisers take great pride in their professional judgement, at the same time they are operating in an 
environment that might lead to political pressure to revise legislation in order to avoid these 
outcomes. 
 On the other hand, the devolution scheme departs in important ways from other 
jurisdictions associated with this model (such as Canada, New Zealand the United Kingdom). First, at 
its apex sits a strong rather than a constrained form of judicial review. Second, the devolved 
institutions lack full autonomy from other governments in terms of the scope of their legislative 
powers. Third, and perhaps most significantly, the Scotland Act requires a far more expansive range 
of institutional assessments of competence that combine so as to create stronger incentives than 
exist in other jurisdictions for the executive to revisit opinions of competence or to consider making 
legislative amendments. One significant exception to this pattern of cross-institutional checks is the 
case of amendments. Whilst legislation is subject to rigorous examination across the devolved and 
UK institutions during the pre-introduction period there is no mechanism for the Presiding Officer to 
reconsider the question of competence in light of amendments made during the passage of the Bill, 
nor will OAG have the benefit of prior discussion with the Scottish Government about amendments 
before a decision has to made whether or not to refer a Bill to the Supreme Court. If a strength of 
the devolution scheme is that constitutional boundaries are policed in an iterative and impactful 
dynamic between institutions, in the case of amendments a heavy reliance is placed on internal 
scrutiny of the executive by the executive, with the possibility of a reference by the Lord Advocate 
hanging over government amendments introduced at stage 2. 
 With this said, we have seen that the plurality of these mechanisms might serve to 
undermine legislative review in one important sense. If an aim of such review is to create incentives 
whereby Ministers and MSPs anxiously scrutinise legislation for competence as well as for other 
policy-based concerns, the legalistic method and nature of these assessments, as well as the legal 
sanction which awaits incompatible legislation, is such as to dissuade political actors from 
challenging the legal advice which precedes them. In this way legislative review is deferred by 
political actors to the bureaucratic review of officials, displacing any serious, transparent and 
accessible political debate about the contested boundaries of legislative competence during the 
legislative process proper. 
